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For decades, our political leaders have
told us that we need to use energy more
ef½ciently and derive more of it from
domestic sources.1 Since the energy cri-
sis of 1973, U.S. presidents have declared
the need to gain independence from un-
stable foreign energy suppliers and to do
so with the same moral fortitude as if
½ghting a war. Some politicians have
proposed massive government programs
to achieve the goals of their energy poli-
cies; others have sought to unleash free-
market forces that would encourage
companies to develop novel sources of
energy and motivate consumers to use
energy more wisely. 
Despite more than three decades of
such efforts, the United States has not
achieved the goal of energy indepen-
dence. While progress in adopting more
energy-ef½cient technologies has saved
billions of dollars throughout the econo-
my, most other indicators of energy au-
tonomy–such as the percentage of im-
ported fuel–demonstrate that the coun-
try has become less independent than
ever. President Bush acknowledged this
fact in his recent State of the Union ad-
dress, telling Americans that the coun-
try has become “addicted to oil” and
urging citizens to ½nd alternative ways
to satisfy their energy needs. For those
with a sense of history, Bush’s clarion
call sounded eerily familiar. 
Even though energy ef½ciency has tak-
en root in some sectors of the economy,
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it has not compensated for the growth in
energy consumption that has occurred
since 1973, nor will it (if current trends
continue) accommodate the growth 
that forecasters anticipate in coming
decades. Moreover, America’s depen-
dence on oil from insecure or politically
unstable countries has required exten-
sive diplomatic and military efforts that
incur huge costs borne by energy users
and taxpayers. Today’s information
economy also remains inextricably tied
to reliable power and to just-in-time
manufacturing and distribution process-
es that depend on fleets of petroleum-
guzzling trucks and airplanes. 
Disruptions in increasingly fragile
energy systems can cause havoc to the
nation’s economy and to everyday life.
We have already had a taste of such dis-
ruptions in the form of the California
electricity crisis of 2000 to 2001, the
2003 Northeast blackout, and the fuel-
supply interruptions resulting from the
Gulf Coast hurricanes in 2005. These
disruptions may be trivial preludes to
what could be more substantial future
catastrophes. Indeed, the country faces
at least ½ve immense and interconnected
energy challenges due to (1) the risk of
oil-supply disruptions; (2) increasing
electricity usage; (3) a fragile electric-
power (and overall energy) infrastruc-
ture; (4) the lack of sustained efforts to
push energy-ef½ciency practices; and 
(5) the growing environmental impacts
of increasing energy consumption. 
First, the United States remains vul-
nerable to the risk of oil-supply disrup-
tions, despite plenty of warnings over
the past three decades. In 1973 the Arab
members of the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (opec) or-
chestrated an oil embargo, the ½rst sup-
ply disruption to cause major price in-
creases and a worldwide energy crisis. 
In unadjusted terms, the price of oil on
world markets rose from $2.90 per barrel
in September 1973 to $11.65 per barrel in
December 1973. Further price hikes and
economic repercussions accompanied
the Iranian revolution in 1979. Eleven
years later–in 1990–when Iraqi forces
invaded Kuwait, opec controlled rough-
ly 5.5 million barrels per day (mbd) of
spare capacity, enough to replace the 
oil from the combatant countries and 
to supply about 8 percent of global de-
mand. Even so, the elimination of Iraqi
and Kuwaiti shipments contributed to
oil prices jumping from around $21.50
per barrel in January 1991 to $28.30 in
February 1991. 
In 2005, opec’s spare production ca-
pacity stood at only 2 percent of world
demand, with roughly 90 percent of this
spare capacity located in Saudi Arabia.
The rapidly growing demand for oil by
China and India to fuel their expanding
economies has placed unprecedented
pressure on the world supply of oil, lead-
ing to recent prices of crude oil at $70
per barrel and higher. Because spare pro-
duction capacity is both extremely limit-
ed and concentrated in one volatile re-
gion, world oil markets remain vulnera-
ble to short-term disruptions. This situa-
tion will not likely improve since almost
half of the world’s proven reserves of
conventional oil are in Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, and Iran.
The United States remains more sus-
ceptible today to oil-supply disruptions
and price spikes than at any time in the
recent past. It has grown to become the
world’s largest oil consumer by a consid-
erable margin while its domestic oil pro-
duction has rapidly diminished. Oil im-
ports have ½lled the expanding gap and
accounted for 58 percent of total U.S. oil
consumption in 2005–up from 22 per-
cent in 1970. 
To obtain a sense of the consequences
of a disruption in a constrained world 








oil market, the National Commission on
Energy Policy, a bipartisan group of six-
teen leading energy experts, simulated
an ‘oil-supply shockwave’ in 2005. Un-
rest in oil-producing Nigeria, an attack
on an Alaskan oil facility, and the emer-
gency evacuation of foreign nationals
from Saudi Arabia precipitated the
imagined shockwave, which removed
three mbd from the world’s market of
oil. As result of these events, the price 
of gasoline in the United States rose to
$5.75 per gallon, two million Americans
lost their jobs, and the consumer price
index jumped 13 percent. Worse, pan-
elists who participated in the study con-
cluded that we could do nothing to avoid
these impacts after the hypothetical dis-
ruptions began. 
The stagnating fuel economy of cars
has contributed to America’s vulnerabil-
ity to oil disruptions. Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (cafe) standards for cars
peaked in 1985 at 27.5 miles per gallon.
For the past two decades, consumer (and
manufacturer) preferences for larger and
more powerful autos have negated tech-
nological advances in front-wheel drive
transmissions, electronic fuel injection,
enhanced power-train con½gurations,
and computer-controlled engines, which
would improve gas mileage even if noth-
ing else were changed in cars. New-vehi-
cle fuel economy therefore remains no
higher today than in 1981, but automo-
bile weight has increased by 24 percent
and horsepower has almost doubled. In
addition, more cars populate the roads,
and are driven more miles each year. The
net result of these trends has been grow-
ing demand for oil in the transportation
sector and greater imports to meet that
demand.
Second, the United States continues to
see increasing demand for electricity in a
way that threatens its ability to produce
it. The country consumed about 167 per-
cent more electricity in 2004 than it did
in 1970, with power usage growing from
25 percent of the nation’s total energy
use in 1970 to 40 percent in 2004. And
this demand for electricity will continue
to grow: the Energy Information Admin-
istration forecasted in 2005 that electric-
ity use will increase at a rate of 1.9 per-
cent annually through 2025. Though
much lower than the 7 percent annual
growth rate experienced before the 1973
energy crisis, the current rate would still
require a doubling of electricity produc-
tion in about thirty-seven years. 
Increased demand for power in the
past decade has been met almost exclu-
sively through the use of quickly built
and increasingly ef½cient natural-gas
combustion turbines or combined-cycle
equipment. Indeed, more than 150 giga-
watts (gw) of gas-½red power genera-
tion have been added to the power grid
between 1999 and 2004, which totaled
about 1,000 gw for the nation in 2004.
Despite the high price of this clean-
burning gas in the last few years, its use
in new power plants seems likely to in-
crease. 
But energy analysts see problems 
with this trend. The National Petroleum
Council predicts that current North
American sources will be able to satisfy
only 75 percent of domestic demand 
for natural gas. Questions of security
will likely emerge as the trend of natu-
ral-gas imports begins to emulate the
increasing trend of petroleum imports.
Aggravating this concern is the possi-
bility that today’s nuclear-power plants
could be retired over the next ½fty years
as current licenses expire, depriving the
nation of one of its key noncarbon ener-
gy sources and pushing up demand for
natural gas if that fuel replaces nuclear
energy for electricity production.
What about other sources of power?
Coal’s high carbon content and added




cost of pollution abatement will con-
tinue to pose challenges for power pro-
viders. Clean coal technologies such as
integrated gasi½cation combined cycle
and fluidized bed combustion offer 
policymakers a way to capture concen-
trated streams of carbon dioxide, but
they still remain years away from com-
mercial viability. Because of security
problems related to fuel sources and
waste disposal, as well as potential pub-
lic opposition, new nuclear technology
also cannot be counted on for wide-
spread near-term use. And despite some
impressive federal and state efforts to
promote them, non-hydro renewables
(such as biomass, geothermal, wind, 
and solar) have gained only a 2 percent
share of electricity generation over the
past thirty years. Reductions in the cost
of power produced from renewables in
this time have been impressive, making
them look increasingly attractive for fu-
ture use. Yet the intermittence of renew-
ables–especially the most cost-effective
wind turbines–coupled with high capi-
tal costs, a host of lingering utility-mo-
nopoly rules, and public opposition to
local siting will likely prevent such tech-
nologies from taking over the bulk of
the generation burden, at least in the
next thirty years. Overall, it appears that
meeting future demand for electricity
will become an increasingly arduous un-
dertaking.
Third, the electric-power-transmission
infrastructure remains precarious and
brittle, despite its increasing use. Data
from the Edison Electric Institute and
the Electric Power Research Institute
note that utility investment in transmis-
sion peaked at almost $10 billion in 1970,
but declined to an inadequate level of
$2.2 billion in 1998 (in 2003 dollars).
Spending grew to $3.8 billion in 2002
and $4.1 billion in 2003, though many
analysts still feel more investment is
necessary to transmit power to the grow-
ing wholesale and retail markets that
have been created since utility-industry
restructuring began in the 1990s. 
But much higher spending may not 
be forthcoming, given that (as noted in 
a 2003 rand Corporation study) incen-
tives in the partially deregulated utility
industry favor minimal investments in
transmission facilities. Because federal
regulators generally limit rates of return
on transmission investments, compa-
nies often prefer to construct and oper-
ate new generation facilities, whose un-
capped rates of return depend only on
market conditions. To complicate mat-
ters more, local opposition to new pow-
er lines has grown over the years as the
country has become more populated, re-
sulting in delayed construction (or can-
cellation) of some transmission facili-
ties. Taken together, these trends have
resulted in a decreasingly reliable trans-
mission network in many regions of the
United States, with grid components be-
ing operated close to (or at) their techni-
cal limits. 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 includes
provisions to respond to some infra-
structural problems, such as incentives
to increase investment in transmission
lines and to simplify the planning and
permitting process for building them.
These measures may help, as thousands
of miles of new transmission lines may
be required if the electric-utility system
expands along the same lines as it has 
for the past several decades. Increasing
demand for other forms of energy in 
the future may also stress the country’s
infrastructure. Numerous new port ter-
minals will be required to handle in-
creased imports of lique½ed natural gas
and oil, for example. At the same time,
new carbon-sequestration sites, bio-
energy facilities, and hydrogen reposito-
ries and pipelines may be needed, espe-








cially as efforts increase to reduce envi-
ronmental pollution. But these needs
will not be easily met. Carbon seques-
tration, for example, may require use 
of depleted oil and gas ½elds, unmine-
able deep coal seams, or cavernous sa-
line formations. The successful use of
these geological formations will depend
on techniques that resist operator and
equipment failure, extreme weather, 
and malicious interference or attacks.
Similar concerns over technical errors
and assaults arise when considering the
need for expansion of natural-gas and
petroleum facilities. Opposition to con-
struction of these new infrastructural
elements has already become evident.
Put simply, the future health of the
country’s energy infrastructure may be
in peril.
Fourth, the country faces immense
challenges in promoting more energy-
ef½cient technologies. Before the 1973
opec oil embargo, U.S. energy con-
sumption grew in lockstep with the na-
tion’s gross domestic product (gdp).
Measured in terms of energy consump-
tion per dollar of gdp, the energy inten-
sity of the nation remained constant.
Economic growth appeared to require
consuming more energy. 
This trend changed in the period after
the 1973 energy crisis, when the econo-
my (as measured by the inflation-adjust-
ed gdp) grew by 148 percent (from 1973
to 2004). Total U.S. energy consump-
tion, meanwhile, grew from about sev-
enty-six quadrillion British Thermal
Units of energy (quads) to almost one
hundred quads in the same period, an
increase of 32 percent. The energy in-
tensity of the economy, in other words,
dropped considerably. 
What accounted for the change? In-
dividuals purchased more fuel-ef½cient
cars and appliances; they insulated and
weatherproofed their homes; and they
adjusted thermostats to reduce energy
consumption. These measures led to a
decrease in per capita residential ener-
gy use of 27 percent (and 37 percent per
household) despite a 50 percent increase
in new home size since 1970 and the
growing use of air conditioning, elec-
tronic equipment, and a multitude of
‘plug loads.’ Businesses retro½tted their
buildings with more ef½cient heating
and cooling equipment and installed en-
ergy management and control systems,
accounting for a 25 percent decline in en-
ergy use per square foot of commercial
building space. Factories adopted more
‘energy-stingy’ manufacturing processes
and employed more ef½cient motors for
conveyors, pumps, fans, and compres-
sors. These gains in energy productivi-
ty, prompted by high fuel costs and gov-
ernment policies, represent one of the
great economic success stories of this
century. If the nation’s energy intensity
remained the same today as it stood in
1970, the United States would be con-
suming twice as much energy, and its
energy bill would be approximately $1
billion higher per day.
While such data suggest that energy-
ef½ciency investments provide an eco-
nomic and relatively rapid strategy for
meeting the growing demand for ener-
gy services, many experts assert that
ef½ciency can only play a limited poli-
cy role. For example, Hans Blix, the for-
mer director of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, has argued, “The more
ef½cient use of energy will only partially
slow down the expanding use of energy.
Although our light bulbs will save elec-
tricity, we shall have more lights.” Simi-
larly, Vice President Dick Cheney stated
in 2001 that “conservation may be a sign
of personal virtue, but it is not a suf½-
cient basis for a sound, comprehensive,
energy policy.” And Spencer Abraham,
President Bush’s Secretary of Energy




from 2001 to 2005, reiterated this view
when he told senators that “improved
energy ef½ciency cannot do the whole
job . . . . [T]he United States will need
more energy supply.” In short, ef½ciency
may help the nation overcome some of
its energy woes, but policymakers do 
not feel it will be the ultimate solution.
As a result, the potential for improved
energy ef½ciency is not being vigorously
tapped.
Fifth and ½nally, the trend toward
more energy consumption will exacer-
bate already prominent concerns about
the environment. Since the 1960s, tech-
nically trained people, politicians, and
the public have become aware of the
health consequences of the exploration,
extraction, transportation, and combus-
tion of fuels used for making energy.
They have also become alert to possible
dangers of living near high-voltage pow-
er lines and radioactive-waste sites.
More recently, people have pointed to
the ecological damage created by hydro-
electric dams and wind turbines, while
also noting that the use of biomass from
energy crops may promote agricultural
monocultures that can pose severe risks
to ecological diversity.
Efforts resulting from three decades 
of clean-air legislation have decreased
sulfur-dioxide emissions from electric
generators in the United States. Never-
theless, air pollution remains a serious
threat to human and ecosystem health.
Americans have experienced a rise in
respiratory illnesses, and visibility con-
tinues to degrade in formerly pristine
areas as a result of pollution from ve-
hicles and coal-burning power plants.
Rarely, for example, does visibility in 
the Great Smoky Mountains National
Park achieve its ‘natural’ limit of nine-
ty-three miles. Instead, average annual
visibility has decreased to twenty-½ve
miles in the winter and to twelve miles
in the summer. Beyond air-pollution
issues, current energy trends will lead 
to expanded emissions of greenhouse
gases, which appear to be contributing
to increased global temperatures, reces-
sion of glaciers, and more frequent and
powerful weather events such as hurri-
canes.
The pollution associated with elec-
tric-power production was vividly doc-
umented by the August 14, 2003, North-
east blackout. Not only did the event
shut off electricity for 50 million people
in the United States and Canada, it also
halted emissions from many fossil-½red
power plants across the Ohio Valley and
the Northeast. In effect, the power out-
age served as an inadvertent demonstra-
tion of the environmental consequences
of electricity generation: twenty-four
hours after the blackout, New York
City’s sulfur-dioxide concentrations
dropped 90 percent; particulate matter
fell by 70 percent; and ozone concentra-
tions slipped to half.
Beyond federal clean-air initiatives,
state-government policies have, in cer-
tain cases, made positive inroads to pol-
lution abatement. Due to legislative and
regulatory initiatives, California–which
generates roughly one-fourth of its elec-
tricity from ef½ciently distributed and
renewable energy technologies–emitted
only 493 metric tons of carbon dioxide 
in 2002, a mere 12 percent increase from
its emission levels in 1990, despite an in-
crease in electricity demand of almost 25
percent.
Though making impressive inroads in
pollution abatement efforts, California
(and a few other states) remains the ex-
ception, not the rule. Few people dispute
the fact that total U.S. emissions of car-
bon dioxide from energy consumption
have increased signi½cantly: from 4.3
billion metric tons in 1970 to 5.9 billion
metric tons in 2004. Moreover, the Ener-








gy Information Administration forecast-
ed in 2005 that carbon-dioxide emis-
sions from energy use will grow an aver-
age 1.5 percent annually for the next
twenty years, resulting in 8.1 billion met-
ric tons of carbon-dioxide emissions in
2025. Clearly, the last thirty years have
not seen the adoption of the low-carbon
power and fuels needed to help stabilize
atmospheric concentrations of green-
house gases. Continued growth in ener-
gy usage will likely exacerbate environ-
mental problems.
To conclude, despite three decades of
‘progress’ since the 1973 energy crisis,
the United States faces a host of energy
challenges that threaten the nation’s
economy, security, and lifestyle. Because
of its huge dependence on imported oil
to fuel a transportation sector that has
seen little improvement in energy ef½-
ciency, the nation could be ravaged by
disruptions to oil supplies due to weath-
er, war, or terrorist attacks. At the same
time, growing electricity consumption
and reliance on power plants employing
natural gas, along with a constrained
transmission grid, make the electric-
utility infrastructure increasingly vul-
nerable to service disruptions. And
while ef½ciency efforts have successful-
ly stemmed the growth rate of fuel con-
sumption in the last few decades, popu-
lation increases and economic expan-
sion have forced up the nation’s overall
use of energy, exacerbating the country’s
environmental problems. 
As a consequence of these trends, the
goal of energy independence seems
more distant in 2006 than it did in 1974,
when President Nixon ½rst proposed it
as a way to deal with the oil embargo.
While one can fruitfully debate whether
complete reliance on domestic energy
sources should be the objective of gov-
ernment policy, the fact remains that the
United States cannot continue upon its
present course. The country has become
progressively vulnerable to economic,
political, and military threats because 
of its growing fuel consumption and an
increasingly challenged energy infra-
structure. The nation’s policymakers in
business and government, as well as the
citizenry, need to realize that the recent
trends in energy consumption, produc-
tion, and distribution reflected in this
energy assessment cannot be sustained
inde½nitely. Americans must confront
energy concerns as a top priority and
learn to overcome the social, political,
and technical obstacles that have hin-
dered true progress for more than three
decades.
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